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Abstract. The widespread usage of password authentication in online
websites leads to an ever-increasing concern, especially when considering
the possibility for an attacker to recover the user password by leveraging
the loopholes in the password recovery mechanisms. Indeed, if a website
adopts a poor password management system, this choice makes useless
even the most robust password chosen by its users. In this paper, we first
provide a survey of currently adopted password recovery mechanisms.
Later, we model an attacker with different capabilities and we show how
current password recovery mechanisms can be exploited in our attacker
model. Then, we provide a thorough analysis of the password manage-
ment of some of the Alexa’s top 200 websites in different countries, in-
cluding England, France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Of these 1,000 web-
sites, 722 do not require authentication—and hence are excluded by our
study—, while out of the remaining 278 we focused on 174—since 104
demanded a complex registration procedure. Of these 174, almost 25%
of the them have critical vulnerabilities, while 44% have some form of
vulnerability. Finally, we propose some effective countermeasures and we
point out that, by considering the entry into force of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May, 2018, most of websites are not
compliant with the legislation and may incur in heavy fines. This study,
other than being important on its own since it highlights some severe
current vulnerabilities and proposes corresponding remedies, has the po-
tential to also have a relevant impact on the EU industrial ecosystem.
Keywords: Authentication mechanism · Password recovery · Security.
1 Introduction
The countless attacks on websites in recent years have underlined once again that
security is often considered a feature, rather than a necessity [17]. The victims
of such attacks are the users that, unaware of the management of the provided
confidential information, will find their identity compromised on the web. In fact,
even if a user would adopt all known good practices to choose a really strong
password to enforce access control, a single website that stores information in
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an insecure way would be enough to compromise confidentiality at least. Ex-
amples are the data breaches suffered by both the professional networking site
LinkedIn [2] and the Internet service company Yahoo [5]. LinkedIn suffered a
major breach in June 2012, when 6.5 million encrypted passwords were posted
on a Russian website. Things got much worse in May 2016, when 117 million
LinkedIn credentials (i.e., combination of e-mails and passwords) were posted
for sale on the Dark Web [1]. Although LinkedIn was a well-known and well-
established website, poor cryptography techniques were implemented [25], by
making easier for hackers to decrypt users’ passwords. The attack targeting Ya-
hoo was the biggest one in history, which led to the breach of 3 billion passwords.
The hack began with a spear-phishing e-mail sent to a Yahoo employee, that
eventually led to the acquisition of the entire users database by the attacker
(containing names, phone numbers, password challenge questions and answers,
password recovery e-mails and a cryptographic value unique to each account) [8].
If it were true that history taught, we should have solved (or at least mitigated)
problems of this kind, but reality is different. In fact, in this work we point out
that almost 44% of the top Alexa’s websites we considered (out of the top 200
of respectively England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, shown in Table 3)
do store users password in a form that can be easily exploited. While the impact
of these findings are relevant on their own, their consequences for companies
are magnified when taking into account the GDPR—the poor security measures
adopted by the web sites are a clear violation of.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [6] leads to an important
change in the vision of both data privacy and data security. Born as an evo-
lution of the previous Data Protection Directive, adopted in 1995, it becomes
enforceable from May 25th, 2018. With its entry into force, all the websites,
agencies, enterprises, organizations, that make use of the personal data of the
users have to guarantee their protection both by design and default in any opera-
tion. In case of non-compliance, these entities are subject to very heavy penalties
ranging from 10-20 million euros to 2-4% of the annual worldwide turnover of
the previous financial year, unsustainable by most organizations.
Contributions. In this paper we first provide a survey of both users authen-
tication mechanisms implemented by websites and related password recovery
mechanisms. Then we model a realistic attacker with different capabilities, re-
spectively Mail Service Provider attacker, Web Server Intruder attacker, Client
Intruder attacker, and Sniffing attacker. Later we provide a thorough analysis
for users password management Alexa’s top 200 websites of the five aforemen-
tioned European countries. Then, we study in detail which information could be
obtained by our modeled attacker and we show how she can break the access
control mechanisms.
Results are striking; of the 174 analyzed websites (see Table 3) almost 25% of
the websites do have from poor to very poor password management, and an
overall of 43.68% are vulnerable to at least one of the presented attacks—note
that all the attacks happen because of the non-compliance of the websites to the
GDPR prescriptions, hence having the corresponding organizations being sub-
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ject to the cited fines. Finally we present some effective countermeasures that
do match the GDPR requirements and that would prevent such attacks to occur.
Road-map: In Section 2, we report on the related work in the literature. In
Section 3, we provide a technical background of both user authentication on
websites and the password recovery mechanisms. In Section 4, we define our
attacker model. In Section 5, we describe the methodology we adopted and we
present the results of the analysis. In Section 6 we propose countermeasures
to mitigate the discovered vulnerabilities, while in Section 7 we report some
concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
LinkedIn data breaches in June 2012 [2] and Yahoo data breaches in August
2013 [5], made respectively 6.5 million and 3 billion users accounts compro-
mised, but these compromises are only the tip of the iceberg. However, these
attacks have not affected the popularity of passwords. In fact, passwords remain
the most widespread authentication mechanism on the web. The use of a pass-
word introduces a secret that is shared by only the authenticator (the website),
and the user wishing to be authenticated.
From the moment they were adopted, a number of scientific articles were pub-
lished with the aim of highlighting their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In [20]
the authors analyzed half a million Windows Live users’ passwords, pointing out
that a user has 6.5 passwords shared across 3.9 different sites on average. Further-
more, each user is the owner of about 25 accounts and types an average of 8 pass-
words per day. Most of the picked passwords are extremely weak, in fact, if not
forced, users choose passwords composed by solely lowercase letters. Dell’Amico
et al., in [19] focused on the empirical study of real-world passwords. They im-
plemented and used several state-of-the-art techniques for password guessing to
analyze the password strength of Internet application. They found that users put
relatively little effort in choosing their password when compared to the choice
of their usernames. The human component plays a fundamental role in both
the security and the robustness of the authentication mechanisms. Indeed, even
the most advanced system would be compromised if users pay little attention to
their password choice.
Passwords authentication mechanisms will still be used for years, as “something
you know” mechanisms are extremely less expensive (but also less secure) than
both “something you have” and “something you are”—these latter ones being
prone also to false positive and false negative. By considering this, it is of funda-
mental importance to guarantee both secure access and secure storage, as well
as secure mechanism to retrieve the password in case of forgetfulness or theft.
In [21], the authors presented an assessment of password practices on 10 popular
websites, including Facebook, Amazon, Yahoo, Google, and YouTube. They ex-
amined password selection, the restrictions enforced on password choice, and the
recovery/reset of the password if forgotten. They pointed out that no website
4 Simone Raponi and Roberto Di Pietro
provides adequate coverage of all the criteria taken into account. The result is
worrying, as the websites analyzed are among the most visited on the web and
therefore (should be) the safest.
When we lose or forget our passwords we generally use our e-mail address to
retrieve them, assuming that we are the only ones who have the access. S.L.
Garfinkel, in [23], wondered if an e-mail-Based Identification and Authentica-
tion (EBIA) method could substitute the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The
EBIA technique considers an e-mail address as a universal identifier and the
ability to receive an e-mail at that address as a kind of authenticator. Among
the many limitations, the author pointed out two many vulnerabilities: EBIA
security strongly depends on the security of e-mail servers and password; e-mail
content is accessible to server operators (without encryption, system managers
can intercept, read, and make copies of e-mail messages intended for end users).
Although the paper is dated back 2003, EBIA is the main used secondary (also
known as emergency) authentication method nowadays, with the same vulnera-
bilities (and a few additional ones) left unresolved. One possible countermeasure
would be to use secure e-mail services, such as ProtonMail [10]. ProtonMail is an
open-source end-to-end encrypted e-mail service founded in 2014 at the CERN.
This service allows to protect the user’s privacy and anonymity by not logging
IP addresses which can be linked to the account, furthermore the end-to-end
encryption makes unreadable the e-mail content even to the e-mail provider.
In recent years, various alternatives were proposed to manage the secondary au-
thentication mechanism in a safer way. After “something you have”, “something
you are”, and “something you know”, in [18] the authors explored a fourth-
factor authentication: “somebody you know”. They focused in a process called
vouching, a peer-level authentication in which a user (called helper), leverages
her primary authenticator to assist a second user (called asker) to perform sec-
ondary authentication. They designed a prototype vouching system for SecurID,
a hardware authentication token, to allow an helper to grant temporary access
privileges to an asker who has lost the ability to use her own. Although in-
teresting, this method requires a primary authentication mechanism based on
token, hence “something you have”, which is not implemented by most web sites.
In [29] Schechter et al. exploited the social-authentication to let users who have
forgotten their passwords to regain access to their account. The proposed system
employs trustees, users previously appointed by account holders to verify their
identity. To get the access into her account, the account holder contacts their
trustees in person or by phone, so that their trustees may recognize her by ei-
ther her appearance or her voice. Once the recognition has occurred, the trustees
provide the account holder with an account recovery code, that will be necessary
to authenticate her in the system. This mechanism is safer with respect to the
ones currently adopted but may have usability problems. Trustees may not be
available at the time of request, making it impossible to the requesting user to
recover her account.
The secondary authentication mechanisms are discussed and analyzed in [28].
In this work the authors considered four key criteria (i.e., reliability, security,
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authentication, and setup efficiency) to evaluate several secondary authentica-
tion mechanisms, such as security questions, printed shared secrets, previously
used passwords, e-mail-based verification, phones or other services, trustees, and
in-person proofing. Although they provided a thorough analysis of these mecha-
nisms, no attackers were modeled and no experimental website security analysis
was performed.
3 Technical Background
In this section, a technical background of both user authentication mechanisms
on websites and password recovery mechanisms adopted by websites are pro-
vided.
3.1 User authentication on websites
With user authentication on websites we refer to the process in which the cre-
dentials provided by the user are compared to those stored either in websites
database or in a cloud server. If the credentials match, the authentication process
is completed and the requesting user is granted authorization to access. Accord-
ing to both the website type and restrictions, there are a few user authentication
methods [22]. A combination of these methods leads to a more accurate identi-
fication of the user:
– 1FA: the 1-Factor-Authentication (1FA) method requires only one factor to
authenticate a user. Usually it takes into account “something the user knows”
(e.g., a password or a PIN code). 1FA is the authentication mechanism most
commonly adopted by current websites;
– 2FA: the 2-Factor-Authentication (2FA) method requires two factors to au-
thenticate a user. It takes into account both “something the user knows”
and either “something the user has” (e.g., physical token or a smart card) or
“something the user is” (e.g., fingerprints, retinal or iris scans, voice recog-
nition, hand geometry). This mechanism is adopted in most of the sensitive
websites (e.g., bank websites) and is optional in others (e.g., Gmail [14],
ProtonMail [11]);
– 3FA: the 3-Factor-Authentication (3FA) method requires a user being au-
thenticated with “something she knows” as well as with both “something she
has” and “something she is”. This mechanism has not been adopted by the
websites, probably due to the infrastructure costs that would derive from it.
3.2 Password recovery
Password recovery is a mechanism implemented by websites that allows to re-
cover the user’s secret password in case the password is lost or forgotten. During
the years, numerous mechanisms have been proposed to recover the password,
the most frequently adopted are reported below.
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Security Questions. When the account holder loses or forgets her password,
the password recovery mechanism starts up and provides the user with security
questions. This mechanism is based on the assumption that only the account
holder is able to answer correctly. Some websites make use of a set of pre-
packaged standard questions, while others allow the users to choose their own.
In each case, several work demonstrated both limits and vulnerabilities of this
mechanism. Using a set of pre-packaged password is quite insecure in the era
of the information; answering questions like “what is the name of your primary
school?” or “what is your favorite movie?” becomes trivial by having access to all
the personal information that the user publishes on the various social networks.
On the other hand, users could choose their own customized security questions.
Even in this case, several work [24],[28] demonstrated how weak the mechanism
is. As they mention, users have to select questions that are memorable, not
researchable on-line, reasonably unpopular with other users, and unknown by
any untrusted acquaintances.
Previously used passwords. Websites, as a password recovery mechanism,
could ask the user to enter one (or a set of) previously used password(s). How-
ever, users tend to use a limited number of passwords for the web services they
access, this phenomenon leading to the unavoidable use of the same password
for one or more services. Given that, it should be easy for users to remember
one of the password previously used—with high probability it will be a pass-
word they are currently using for another web service. Although with both some
limitations (e.g., the user may not remember any of the previous passwords)
and many security problems (e.g., the attacker may know some of the previous
passwords of the victim that could be in use to access other services on differ-
ent platforms) this mechanism could be useful and less dangerous than the ones
currently implemented. It is worth noting that this method cannot be applied if
the password has been lost or stolen for the first time.
E-mail-based authentication. The most common password recovery mecha-
nism is e-mail-based authentication, which relies on the assumption that only the
account holder will be able to access a secret sent to her e-mail account [23][28].
As we will discuss in Section 5, websites can provide the requesting user with
her credential information in several ways:
– sending the old password by e-mail;
– sending a new password by e-mail;
– sending a new temporary password by e-mail;
– sending an HTTP link by e-mail (that will allow the requesting user to choose
a new password);
– sending an HTTPS link by e-mail (that will allow the requesting user to
choose a new password).
The vulnerabilities of this mechanism are detailed in the following sections.
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Other password recovery mechanisms. Many alternatives have been pro-
posed to manage the password recovery mechanisms in a safer way. Phone num-
bers can be used for user authentication: the website can send users an SMS
message or use an automated voice system to call them and provide an account
recovery code. As for e-mail-based authentication, this alternative relies on the
fact that only the device holder will be able to access a secret that has been
sent to the device [28]. Brainard et al., in [18], rely on trustees, users previously
appointed by her account holder to verify her identity. These people will be con-
tacted in case of emergency (the password is either lost or compromised) and
they will be asked to perform the recognition of the requesting user. If the recog-
nition phase is successful they will provide the requesting user with a recovery
code, useful to authenticate her on the website.
4 Adversary Model
Given the websites ecosystem, we consider different categories of adversaries.
An adversary may be undetectable or detectable. An undetectable adversary is
able to impersonate the user on websites without the victim being aware of it.
Conversely, a detectable adversary impersonating the user has a chance of getting
the user being aware, or a least suspicious, of the fact that an impersonation
happened (or could have happened). An adversary may also be active or passive.
An active attacker interacts with websites in order to get information about the
victim (e.g., she can start the recovery procedure on behalf of the victim), while
a passive attacker aims to obtain the target user’s sensitive information without
any interaction with the website. Eventually, both active and passive attackers
can use the obtained information in order to access websites by pretending to
be the victim. Remembering these distinctions (summarized in Table 1), we
introduce four different possible attacks against a single target user, taking into
account a single target website:
– Mail service provider-level attack;
– Web server intruder attack;
– Client intruder attack;
– Sniffing attack.
An e-mail service provider-level attack can be undertaken by both a ma-
licious service provider, or a malicious user that has compromised the e-mail
service provider. This is the most dangerous attack, as the attacker has access
to all the user’s e-mails and can obtain a lot of sensitive information. In the web
server intruder attack, we suppose the attacker was able to violate a website
where the user has registered a personal account. So, the adversary can inter-
act with the database that stores all the passwords of registered users. A client
intruder attack can be undertaken by an adversary that either has violated a
user’s device by obtaining a remote access, or has stolen it. In the sniffing at-
tack we suppose that the attacker has no knowledge about the user, she has
neither access to the website’s password databases nor to the user’s devices. The
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Table 1. Attackers Types
Type Detectable Undetectable
Active Can interact with the
website on behalf of the
victim by revealing her
existence
Can interact with the
website on behalf of the
victim by remaining
transparent to her
Passive Cannot interact with the
website, but her actions will
eventually make the victim
aware of her existence
Cannot interact with the
website and will remain
transparent to the victim
Table 2. Attackers Capabilities
Attackers/Access User e-mails Website password
DB
Website password
recovery method
Mail service provider
attacker
✓ ✗ ✓
Web server intruder
attacker
✗ ✓ ✓
Client intruder
attacker
✓ ✗ ✓
Sniffing attacker ✗ ✗ ✓
only information she has, is about the password recovery methods of the website
(to obtain this information she could register an account on it and start the
recovery procedure). The sniffing adversary can sniff the packets transmitted
during the communication between the client and the website. We assume with-
out loss of generality that the sniffing attacker is not able to read the content of
the exchanged e-mails (for instance, because the HTTPS protocol is used). The
capabilities of attackers are summarized in Table 2.
5 Methodology and Results
In this section we provide the methodology employed to analyze the websites’
passwordmanagement security. The methodology involves two independent choices:
1. which website to take into account for the analysis; and,
2. how to analyze the so chosen websites.
As for the first choice, we decided to make use of the Amazon Alexa Top Sites
web service [3]. Amazon Alexa Top Sites is a web service that provides a list of
websites, ordered by Alexa Traffic Rank. This ranking is determined by a com-
bined measure of both websites’ unique visitors and websites’ page views, and is
updated daily [7]. So, we have selected a subset of countries, respectively Eng-
land, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain according to their subjec
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GDPR regulation—till Brexit happens, UK is subject to GDPR as well. For each
of these countries, we considered the first top 200 websites according to Alexa’s
ranking. The choice of this parameter is due to the fact that as the ranking goes
down, the websites become less and less used–hence, with a reduced impact. We
have therefore created an account and started obtaining the websites’ URLs we
needed. Amazon Alexa provides several ways for obtaining websites information;
in particular, the top websites can be selected according to three major divisions:
global; by country; and by category. The global division, as the name suggests,
shows the most visited websites globally. The division by country, instead, al-
lows to view the most visited websites from specific countries, not necessarily
with the domain registered in the country taken into account (e.g., the website
youtube.com is in the top five of all the countries considered in this analysis,
but its domain is registered in the US). The third division is the more generic
and allows to select the top 200 websites according to different sub-categories
(e.g., adult, arts, computers, recreation, regional, sports, and so on). By select-
ing the regional category, we are able to choose the continent first and then the
specific nations we would like to consider. In this case, Alexa shows the top 200
websites for the countries selected, that represents the top 200 websites with
the domains registered in those countries. Once obtained the websites URLs,
our goal was to analyze them in order to get information about the password
storage management. In the second phase we started by selecting, among the
top 200 websites for each nation, the ones that required a user registration. A
further filtering step was to remove those websites that, in the user registration
phase, required too much information (e.g., bank websites, universities websites,
wholesale reseller websites). In detail, of these 1,000 websites, 722 did not re-
quire authentication—and hence were excluded by our study—, while out of the
remaining 278, we focused on 174—since 104 demanded a complex registration
procedure. The results of this filtering are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Number of analyzed websites (among the top 200 per country)
Country Websites (#)
England 71
France 31
Germany 19
Italy 36
Spain 17
Total 174
Note that only a portion of the websites taken into consideration offer users the
ability to register an account. By considering the number of websites, we decided
to manually perform the analysis of each one, in order to obtain more accurate
and detailed information—while this activity took quite some amount of time
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(around three months), the quality of results is unpaired. In particular, for each
website we carried out the following steps:
– we registered an user account;
– we pretended to have lost the password and we started the recovery proce-
dure; and,
– we collected password recovery information.
Table 4. Websites password recovery mechanisms
Country Websites
(#)
Old Pw New Pw Temp Pw HTTP
link
% of
vulnerable
websites
England 71 1 5 2 16 33.8
France 31 0 10 0 7 54.84
Germany 19 1 1 0 5 36.84
Italy 36 4 11 1 4 55.55
Spain 17 2 5 0 1 47.06
Total 174 8 32 3 33 43.68
We registered for the websites by using a Gmail account created for the ex-
periment, i.e., gdpr.experiment@gmail.com. The results of the analysis are shown
in Table 4. Each column of the table represents a different method of password
recovery adopted by the analyzed websites—these password recovery methods
can be observed from left to right in decreasing order of vulnerability.
5.1 Password recovery methods
In the following, we describe each password recovery method encountered in the
analyzed websites.
Old Password. The most vulnerable websites are the ones that use the Old
Pw method for the password recovery phase. In detail, after having completed
the “forgotten password” procedure, the website sends the original password of
the user in her registration e-mail address. Hence, it appears that websites do
not make use of hash functions or other mechanisms in order to avoid to store
the passwords in cleartext. Considering that most of the users make use of the
same password to access many different services [12], obtaining access to the
database of password stored by the website (by an hacker attack or an internal
website error) would seriously jeopardize both the security and the privacy of
all the registered users. This method of storing password is deprecated since at
least 30 years [27].
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New Password. In this recovery method, after the “forgotten password” pro-
cedure, the website sends a new password to the registration e-mail address of
the user, without obliging her to change the password after the first access.
The security of passwords sent by using this method is summarized in Table 5.
In this analysis we take a lenient stance and consider respectively: strong the
passwords with at least 270 possible combinations; medium the passwords with
at least 250 possible combinations; and weak all the others. We have obtained
this data by requesting a new password 125 times, and by analyzing the type
of provided password. For instance, VUZUK8G3, 484ad5b5, ugrxpn are three of
the passwords provided by a given website following the recovery procedure. It
is possible to see that all the passwords use only uppercase or lowercase letters,
sometimes numbers, never special characters, with an overall length of 8. In this
case, the strength has been computed as 628 ≈ 248 .
Table 5. Password robustness analysis
> 210 > 220 > 230 > 240 > 250 > 260 > 270
New 100% 93.75% 75% 62.5% 3.125% 3.125% 3.125%
Temporary 100% 100% 100% 100% 33.33% 0 0
Note that only 3.125% of the new passwords provided to the users by the website
have what could be considered a decent level of security, while more than 90%
are considered weak. This password choice makes the websites vulnerable to
brute-force attacks, where malicious users can try to guess the users’ password
after requesting the re-sending on behalf of the victims.
Temporary Password. The Temp Pw method consists in sending a temporary
password to the requesting user, where this password must be changed on her
next access. Only few websites make use of this recovery method, and those who
do, they send either weak or medium security password to the requester e-mail
account (see Table 5).
HTTP link. Almost 19% of the websites use the HTTP link as recovery
method. In this case, once the user has requested for the password recovery,
the web service sends an HTTP link to her registration e-mail address. By click-
ing on the link, the requester is redirected to the website on which she can enter
a new password that will be associated with her account. We consider vulnera-
ble those websites that use this recovery method. Indeed it is well-known that
the HTTP protocol does not provide insurance with respect to attacks such as
man in the middle [9], or even simple snooping. Considering that all communi-
cations between user browser and websites are not encrypted, a malicious user
can intercept the message exchange, eavesdrop and modify the communication,
compromising both its confidentiality and integrity.
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HTTPS link. The last analyzed recovery method of the websites is the HTTPS
link one, in which the link sent to the user to let her choose a new password is
based on HTTPS protocol. This method is safer with respect to the others but
it is subject to being exploited as well, as we will detail in the following.
5.2 Attackers capabilities
In this section we describe the capabilities of attackers as well as their charac-
teristics. Results of this study are summarized in Table 6 for passive attackers,
and in Table 7 for active attackers.
Mail service provider-level attacker. A passive e-mail service provider-level
attacker may obtain the user’s log-in information in any case, regardless of the
password recovery methods adopted by the website. In fact, this kind of attacker
has access to the e-mails of the victim, the emergency authentication mechanisms
currently adopted by websites. In case of Old Pw or New Pw recovery methods,
the attacker can even remain undetectable. In fact, by easily reading the pass-
word inside the e-mail, the attacker and the victim would share the same account
unbeknownst to the latter. The attacker is forced to adopt a detectable method
in the other cases (i.e., the adversary can use either the temporary password or
both the HTTP and HTTPS link to log-in with the credentials of the victim, but
once logged in she is forced to change the password, by no longer granting access
to the victim). In this situation, the provider could obtain the credentials (by
reading either the new or the temporary password) as well as the links (either
HTTP or HTTPS) and destroy the received e-mail. The user would not receive
the e-mail but could attribute the fact to a website malfunction. In the mean-
time, the adversary may have entered, obtained the information she needed, and
logged out. There is a good chance of not being suspected at all.
An active e-mail service provider-level attacker could remain undetectable if the
target website stores the passwords of registered users in clear. In fact, by start-
ing the recovery procedure, she can obtain the original password of the user
by e-mail. This e-mail will be deleted from the system as soon as possible. In
all other cases, the password would change and the e-mail service provider-level
attacker will delete the compromising e-mail. The victim would have no longer
access to the website but could attribute the fact to either a website malfunction
or to having forgotten the password.
Web server intruder attacker. The information that a passive web server
intruder attacker can gain is strongly dependent on the password storage man-
agement of the website she has violated. Indeed, if passwords of the registered
users are stored in clear text (i.e., without the support provided by hash func-
tions), the attacker could transparently make use of the credentials of the victim
to access the target website.
The capability does not change from the perspective of an active web server
intruder attacker, because they would still depend to the storage methods. In
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addition, note that the victim would be aware of an attack as it would receive
e-mails with instructions for recovering the password.
Client intruder attacker. A passive client intruder attacker, with remote
or physical access to the device of the victim, would have most of the time
exactly the same capabilities of an e-mail service provider-level attacker (i.e.,
there is often no need to insert a password to access services, most of users
allow the browser to remember it [30]). Furthermore, either remote or physical
access to the device would allow the attacker to find any password file written
by the victim [31], so the attacker capabilities depend on the victim’s behavior.
If the victim does not allow the browser to remember the information about
her credentials, an attacker with remote or temporarily physical access to the
device could install a key-logger software [26], that would capture user input
and provides the attacker the information about the keys typed (including the
passwords of the websites that the victim will visit in that session).
An active client intruder attacker would have the same capabilities of the active
e-mail service provider-level attacker, because of the access to the e-mail account
of the victim.
Sniffing attacker. A passive sniffing attacker can obtain the access information
of a target user mainly in two ways: she can intercept the HTTP communica-
tions, as well as undertake a man-in-the-middle attack [9] during an HTTPS
communication, or she can try to brute-force a target website until the victim’s
credentials are guessed [16]. In this case, unless the website implements some
type of protection (e.g., CAPTCHA, blocking of the account log-in for a few
seconds after n attempts) or warning system (e.g., sending an e-mail to the ac-
count owner after a number of failed log-in attempts), the attacker would be
undetectable due to her knowledge of the password of the victim.
The capabilities of an active sniffing attacker, instead, would be subject to vari-
ous changes. If the server adopts the old Pw recovery method (e.g., it stores the
registered users passwords in clear text and, when requested, it sends back the
original user’s password), the sniffing attacker can ask for the password recovery
on behalf of the user but it would be both detectable (given that the user will
receive the e-mail with the old password) and useless (she should brute-force the
same password as before). In case the web server adopted either New or Temp
Pw password recovery method, instead, the active sniffing attacker would have
useful information about the password she has to brute-force. In fact, even if the
user has a very strong password, the attacker could apply for a new (or a temp)
one on her behalf. In this way, the attacker would know exactly the structure and
the level of security of the new website-generated password and could brute-force
it accordingly. For example, the target user has a very hard-to-guess password,
and the attacker starts the password recovery methods on a target website in her
behalf. The attacker, by registering a personal account on that website, knows
how temp and new passwords are chosen (e.g., only numbers, both capital letter
and numbers, etc.), so she would have useful information about the password
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structure as well as its length. In case of HTTP or HTTPS links used for pass-
word recovery, the attack will become detectable and the attacker would not
gain any additional information about the password with respect to the passive
attacker ones.
Table 6. Synoptic table related to passive attackers
Attacks /
Recovery
methods
Old Pw New Pw Temp Pw HTTP link HTTPS
link
Mail service
provider-level
undetectable undetectable detectable detectable detectable
Web server
intruder
undetectable Depends on
the storage
method
Depends on
the storage
method
Depends on
the storage
method
Depends on
the storage
method
Client
intruder
undetectable undetectable detectable /
Depends on
the user’s
behavior
detectable /
Depends on
the user’s
behavior
detectable /
Depends on
the user’s
behavior
Sniffing undetectable undetectable undetectable undetectable undetectable
Note that two of the main differences between passive and active attackers
involve attack timing and attack extension. On the one hand, active attackers
may get information about the victim’s credentials at any time, while passive
ones must wait for a move from the user. On the other hand, an active attacker
must take immediate actions while a passive attacker can be implemented as a
fragment of autonomous software that will be triggered by certain events (e.g.,
starting of a recovery password procedure by the user, receiving a mail with
credentials/links). This means that passive attacker softwares could be easily
and quickly propagated.
6 Countermeasures
In this section we describe some countermeasures that can be taken into account
to mitigate the different types of attacks exposed in previous sections.
Good Practices. Basic security guidelines dictate, since at the last 40 years,
that passwords should never be stored in clear text. For instance, the password
could be hashed by using a dash of salt, different for each password. The salts
could be stored on the same server of the passwords, because the mere possession
of the salt would not help the attacker to find out the passwords of the users
(i.e., it is very hard to find salted hashes in rainbow tables unless they were
prohibitively large). Another solution can be the implementation of slow hashes
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Table 7. Synoptic table related to active attackers
Attacks /
Recovery
methods
Old Pw New Pw Temp Pw HTTP link HTTPS
link
Mail service
provider-level
undetectable detectable detectable detectable detectable
Web server
intruder
undetectable detectable /
Depends on
the storage
method
detectable /
Depends on
the storage
method
detectable /
Depends on
the storage
method
detectable /
Depends on
the storage
method
Client
intruder
undetectable detectable detectable detectable detectable
Sniffing detectable -
useless
detectable -
simpler
detectable -
simpler
detectable detectable
by websites. The website would suffer negligible delay every time a user registers
an account or logs in, but the password table attack by the attacker would be
infeasible due to the time required. SHA-1, SHA-256, and MD5 are relatively
fast hash functions, while bcrypt, PBKDF2, and scrypt could be used for this
purpose.
Moreover, the password length plays a fundamental role. Computers, Field-
programmable gate array (FPGA), and Application-specific integrated circuit
(ASIC) technologies, are becoming fast and able to brute-force both non-salted
and salted passwords. 8-character passwords are not enough robust even by
using a combination of numbers, lowercase letters, uppercase letters, and special
characters. In fact, even by considering a random password the complexity will
be equal to 958 (< 256), a negligible number if we consider that the validation
of a block of BitCoin transactions requires, as of writing, 272 hashes [4].
Since currently, for most websites, the ability to access an e-mail address
identifies the user as the owner of that address, some further good practices
could be listed as follows:
– do not allow the browsers/websites (especially the e-mail service providers’
ones) to save the password. Better to waste a few seconds to rewrite it than
losing control of your identity on the web;
– always log-out and remove open sessions;
– before inserting either passwords or other sensitive information, make sure
that there are no key loggers in your system (at least the software ones, more
easily detectable);
Cross-Mail service providers secret distribution. In order to avoid e-mail
service provider level attacks, it could be useful to rely on more than one e-
mail service providers, basically by not trusting any of them. When the user
wants to register an account on a website, she will provide it with more than
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one e-mail address, each belonging to a different e-mail service provider. Once
the user has lost her password (or someone has stolen it), she can start the
password recovery procedure. The website will generate a new password and
will split it into a number of chunks equal to the number of different e-mails
account provided by the user during the registration. Finally, the website will
send each fragment to a different email address. Once the user has received
all the fragments, she can put them together in order to rebuilt the original
website-crafted password. A malicious e-mail service provider could only have a
partial view of the whole password and, starting from that, it will be unfeasible
to rebuilt the original one. The user should be careful not to use all the accounts
on the same device, otherwise in case of either client intruder attack or loss of
the device, the attacker would have access to all the victim’s e-mail addresses.
This countermeasure allows to protect from e-mail service provider attacks by
sacrificing a little the usability.
*-based password request. Previous countermeasures, unless particular pre-
cautions are taken by the users, are still subject to the client intruder attacks.
In order to mitigate this issue, these solutions can be integrated with the *-
based password request mechanism. The *-based password request mechanism
requires the user to enter her e-mail account password whenever certain events
occur. Several variations of the mechanism can be used, for example: a time-
based password request mechanism requires the user to enter the e-mail account
password when a pre-determined amount of time has passed (e.g., if the user
wants to open either a new or an old e-mail after 30 minutes she entered the
password the last time, she will be prompted for the password again); event-based
password request mechanism requires the user to enter the password when a pre-
determined sequence of events has occurred (e.g., after n e-mails are opened by
the user, the password will be requested again). There is the possibility of in-
tegrating multiple variations of the highlighted mechanisms to provide the user
with a higher degree of security (e.g., time-based password request mechanism
used in conjunction with the event-based password request mechanism: both
mechanisms are considered to decide whether and when to request the password
to the user). The parameters of these mechanisms can also be learnt automat-
ically by the system after an initial training phase, to provide the user with a
tailored experience.
By using this mechanism, an attacker who has a remote access to the victim’s
system (or a physical access, because in possession of the victim’s device), would
have a limited access to the e-mails, as she would be required to enter the
password (which she does not know).
Choosing a good service provider. There are a number of services that
have been designed to preserve both the privacy and improve the safety of users.
Speaking of e-mail service, the most used are ProtonMail, Tutanota, and Shaz-
zleMail. ProtonMail [10], as well as Tutanota [15], they make use of end-to-end
encryption to hide the content of the e-mails to everyone (including the mail
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service provider itself) except for the interlocutors. ShazzleMail [13] is a free
private e-mail application that turns smart phones into e-mail servers, and users
can deliver messages directly to the receiver by using an SSL encrypted channel
with no server copies.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first provided a survey of both user authentication mechanisms
implemented by websites, and password recovery mechanisms currently adopted.
Then, we modeled an attacker with different capabilities and we showed how
simply she is able to get the users’ confidential information—e.g. recovering
the password, or accessing e-mail. Later, we performed a detailed analysis of
users password management for Alexa’s top 200 websites (see Section 5) of five
European countries, respectively England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.
It is worth noting that analyzed websites are among top ones according to the
Alexa’s ranking, so, they are supposed to be way too secure compared to those
present in the lower ranking. Our results show that, nowadays, almost 44%
of the analyzed websites are vulnerable—simply because lacking adoption of
best practices, and hence subject to the fines complied by the GDPR. We are
currently working on a P2P system based on Blockchain technology to manage
both authentication and password recovery of websites.
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